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Abstract 
Trust is seen as an essential aspect of a founding team’s internal relationships.  Positive 
association between intra-team trust and team effectiveness is recognized in literature. 
Trust and control are commonly considered either substituting or complementary 
phenomena with many scholars arguing that when trust is high the need for control is 
low and when trust is low the need for control is high. While scholars aim to address 
the role of trust in entrepreneurship, the relationship between trust and control and the 
impact on interdependency between founding team members in early stage new venture 
teamwork is largely unexplored.  This paper investigates how new venture teams 
promote trust and control behavior as their venture emerges, utilizing group norms as a 
basis for empirical investigation. We examine the relationship between intra-team trust 
development and control mechanisms in 56 new venture teams, based on 
documentation and participant observation, utilizing a framework to analyze written 
norms for trusting or controlling language. Findings show that venture teams are primed 
for control rather than trust in the early stages of venture creation, and ventures with 
more controlling norms, were seen to be less viable long-term.  
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Introduction 
In order to create successful new ventures, it has been found that entrepreneurs need to 
excel at building and maintaining relationships (Vyakarnam, Jacobs, and Handelberg 
1999). The relationships between founding team members are particularly important 
for venture creation, as success of a venture often depends on a team’s ability to 
capitalize on creative conflict and diversity while encouraging commitment and 
satisfaction among members (Ensley, Pearson, and Amason 2002). Trust is an essential 
aspect of a founding team’s internal relationships, and positive association between 
intra-team trust and team effectiveness has been identified (Johnson and Johnson 1991). 
The ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in new venture creation emphasizes the need 
for trust within the founding team and speaks to why so many new ventures are started 
by spousal pairs, close friends, or familiar colleagues (Aldrich, Carter, and Ruef 2002).  
 
Trust and control are commonly considered either substituting or complementary 
phenomena (Costa and Bijlsma-Frankema 2007) with many scholars arguing that when 
trust is high the need for control is low and when trust is low the need for control is 
high. However some studies have shown that control can facilitate trust-building 
behavior (Woolthuis, Hillebrand, and Nooteboom 2005). While scholars aim to 
understand the control-trust nexus in general (Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa 2005, Costa 
and Bijlsma-Frankema 2007), and address the role of trust in entrepreneurship (Welter 
and Smallbone 2006, Welter 2012) the relationship between trust and control and the 
impact on interdependency between founding team members in early stage new venture 
teamwork is largely unexplored.  In situations of high ambiguity, where outcomes are 
difficult to measure and best practices may be non-obvious (e.g. early stage ventures), 
Eisenhardt (1985) states that social control in the form of establishing shared values 
and norms is the most suitable method of control. Social control is integral to group 
functioning as it can help regulate behavior and achieve organizational goals (Cardinal, 
Sitkin, and Long 2004, Johnson and Johnson 1991). 
 
Early stage new venture teams are challenged to balance social control and trust-based 
behavior. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the way in which new venture 
teams promote control- and trust-based behavior as their venture emerges, utilizing 
group norms as a basis for empirical investigation. Therefore we ask the following 
questions: 
 
RQ1: In what ways if at all do control and trust guide the development of group 
norms in new venture teams?  
 
RQ2: In what ways if at all is trust built through group norms? 
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  We review existing literature regarding trust and 
control in order to establish a theoretical framework.  This framework guides 
methodological coding of group norms documents of new venture teams. The empirical 
coding represents the primary data analysis, complemented by supporting data 
regarding group development and the eventual outcome of the venture, in terms of 
incorporation and market viability.    
 
Theoretical Framework 
Trust and control  both  refer  to  highly  complex  social  processes  for  which 
consensus around definitions have been elusive (Costa and Bijlsma-Frankema 2007). 
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In the following sections, we aim to establish some boundaries between trust and 
control, shaping some working definitions as well as categorizations of trust and 
control. 
 
Trust 
Scholars generally agree that trust is a psychological state that manifests itself in 
behavior towards others ( Kr a me r  1 9 9 9 ) .  Trust is dynamic and multi-faceted and 
can be built, broken, re-built, or maintained over time. Trust constitutes both positive 
expectations and a willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of others (Rousseau 
et al. 1998), where positive expectations generally refer to a belief in the trustee’s a) 
ability or competence b) benevolence or goodwill c) integrity or willingness to fulfill 
commitments and d) predictability (Dietz and Hartog 2006, Mayer, Davis, and 
Schoorman 1995). Trust is also related to risk taking as it is a decision to act that is 
based on the confident positive expectation that  the trustee’s action will be beneficial 
rather than detrimental (Gambetta 1988). Trustor disposition, reputation of the trustee, 
as well as context and circumstance can influence the decision to trust, and trust can be 
granted in specific domains only. For example a person may be fully confident in her 
team member’s capability and professional competence, but may not feel comfortable 
sharing personal feelings or may doubt the intentions of her colleague.  
 
Dietz and Hartog (2006) outline five  qualitative degrees of trust that are described in 
trust literature. The lowest degrees of trust are defined as deterrence- and calculus-
based, which the authors argue are more an illustration of distrust rather than trust. 
These two degrees are based on suspicions rather than positive expectations and parties 
comply due to either the threat of external sanctions or from the perspective of a cost-
benefit analysis. Positive expectations replace suspicion at the ‘threshold of real trust’ 
where trust can develop based on knowledge of an individual’s prior actions and 
character, often termed knowledge-based trust. Trust then deepens and strengthens, 
through relationship-based level to the point of complete trust where individuals 
identify with one another around converged interests, defined as identity-based. The 
nature of the relationship itself is important to the dynamic of trust; stronger, more 
personal relationships often result in more affective forms of trust while more formal 
relationships see a more calculative approach. Deterrence and Calculus-based ‘trust’ 
are often found in non-personal business relationships, where individuals need to 
interact in order to conduct business whereas knowledge, relational, and identification 
based trust are built on more personal, relationship-specific evidence.  
 
Control  
Control mechanisms within an organization are understood as processes that regulate 
the behavior of team members with the aim of better achieving organizational goals 
(Cardinal, Sitkin, and Long 2004). The literature on control outlines two basic types of 
control: external measure-based control, also called formal or objective control, and 
internal value-based control, also called informal or social/normative control 
(Eisenhardt 1985). Formal or external measure-based control relies on the 
establishment and use of formal rules, policies and procedures to monitor and reward 
desirable behavior. Informal or internal value-based control emphasizes norms, culture, 
values, and the internalization of organizational goals to encourage desirable behavior 
and outcomes and to promote congruence of member goals and preferences (Das and 
Teng 2001). The two main modes of formal control are behavioral and output control 
(Ouchi and Maguire 1975). Behavioral control monitors the process that members 
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undertake to achieve a goal whereas output control measures the actual performance or 
outcome of a task and relies on an objective and reliable assessment of performance 
(Das and Teng 2001). Social or informal control is utilized when specific task-related 
behaviors or outcomes are unknown or unspecified. The focus instead shifts to the 
development of shared values, beliefs, and goals among team members as a mechanism 
to reinforce desired behaviors and internalize congruent goals (Das and Teng 2001). 
Eisenhardt (1985) suggests that different contexts and tasks require different modes of 
control and that it is the level of task programmability and output measurability that 
determine the suitability of formal or informal control measures. Task programmability 
refers to the degree to which the task itself and the transformation process of the task 
are understood in so far as appropriate behaviors can be established. Output 
measurability refers to the ability to measure outcomes in an objective and reliable 
manner. When a task is highly programmable and outcomes can be objectively measure 
behavioral and output control are appropriate. On the other hand when tasks are neither 
highly programmable or outcomes easily measured more social forms of control are 
preferred.  
 
The key difference between social and behavior/output control is that neither the 
appropriate behavior nor the desired outcomes are apparent in the beginning. Thus 
social control is suitable to highly ambiguous situations where goals are non-obvious 
or boundaries are not set as to which behaviors or outcomes are desirable. Instead goals 
are set in a decentralized and evolving manner encouraging socialization and 
consensus-making that allows members to become more committed to the organization. 
Formal control is linked to more extrinsic forms of motivation (reward and penalty) 
whereas social control is linked to more intrinsic forms of motivation where individuals 
hold a strong motivation and commitment to goals as they have been internalized (Das 
and Teng 2001). Formal and informal control also interact differently with trust. In 
strategic alliances Das and Teng (2001) propose that while social control enhances both 
benevolence (goodwill) and competence based trust in an alliance both output and 
behavior control undermine these forms of trust.  
 
The descriptors of control and trust, derived from the literature and summarized in 
Table 1 established the analytical framework utilized to code the empirical data.  
 
Table 1.  Analytical Framework  
Code Title Descriptor 
C1 Outcome control • Focus on measuring outcome 
• Emphasis on clear goals 
• Divergent preferences/values 
C2 Behavioral control • Focus on measuring behavior 
• Emphasis on describing how to do something 
(programming of behavior/action) 
• Focus on communication systems 
C3 Social control • Establishing a ‘clan’ or ‘tribe’ [we] 
• Convergence of preferences/values 
• Internalize goals through socialization 
T1 Deterrence-based • Required to work together 
T2 Calculus-based • Work together because benefits outweigh the 
costs 
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• Independent (to the group) confirmation of 
benefit 
T3 Knowledge-based • Positive expectation of group  
• Knowledge of group members motivates, 
abilities, reliability 
T4 Relationship-based • Emphasizing the quality of the relationship 
• Evidence of shared affection (concern for one 
another) 
T5 Identity-based • Unity of purpose 
• Group assumes one identity 
• Any member can represent the interests of the 
group will full confidence of the group members 
 
The control-trust nexus 
The relationship between trust and control is a complex one that researchers have given 
multiple and contradictory interpretations of. Two of the most common perspectives on 
the relationship are the substitution perspective and the complementary perspective 
(Costa and Bijlsma-Frankema 2007). Many scholars argue that control is a substitute 
for trust: when trust is high the need for control is low and when trust is low the need 
for control is high. In his piece on economic action and the problem of embeddedness 
Granovetter (1985) notes that clever institutional structures which come in both formal 
(laws, rules etc.) and non-formal (norms, etc.) flavors of control can and do discourage 
malfeasance however these arrangements do not produce trust but rather are a substitute 
for it. Contracts are another form of control that social scientists often consider in 
conflict with trust (Woolthuis, Hillebrand, and Nooteboom 2005). The need for a 
contract can be interpreted as a sign of distrust (Lyons and Mehta 1997, Neu 1991) and 
can be detrimental to the building and maintaining of trust if contracts are actively 
enforced through activities such as monitoring. Contracts can evoke undesirable 
relationship dynamics such as conflict (Gaski 1984) and defensive behavior 
(Hirschman 1984) and scholars have suggested that it may not be wise to explicitly 
formulate or enforce a contract, particularly in the early stages of a relationship (Fehr 
and Schmidt 2001, Chen 2000). In line with Granovetter (1985) opportunism and 
general malfeasance can be prevented through the development of trust and 
embeddedness of social relations, thereby negating the need for a contract (Woolthuis, 
Hillebrand, and Nooteboom 2005). However despite the fact that the dominating view 
seems to see trust and contract as opposing alternatives (Knights et al. 2001) the 
empirical evidence on the matter is mixed and studies have found that high trust and 
formal control can exist simultaneously, contracts can facilitate trust rather than destroy 
it depending on the content and the way it is written (Woolthuis, Hillebrand, and 
Nooteboom 2005) and trust can act as a precondition for contracts (Larson 1992) 
demonstrating a more complementary perspective (Poppo and Zenger 2002, Zaheer and 
Venkatraman 1995). 
 
The majority of management literature dedicated to analyzing the nexus of trust and 
contract looks at transactional relationships external to the founding team or at 
employee/employer, subordinate/superior or collegial relationships within a firm. Few 
studies appear to exist addressing intra-team relationships and the balance between trust 
and control in early stage new venture teamwork. As a result, the types of contracts that 
are considered are for example supplier/producer agreements and joint ventures. When 
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examining the trust control nexus in early stage new venture teamwork a contract that 
could be of interest is the group norms contract, the psychological contract a team 
makes when embarking on a new venture that relates to their norms, values, believes 
and behaviors (Holmer 2001).  
 
Methodology 
This paper examines the relationship between intra-team trust development and control 
mechanisms in 56 new venture teams, based on documentation and participant 
observation from September 2010 to October 2015. Data is collected from new venture 
teams in their second (and final) year of a masters program in entrepreneurship at a 
technical university.  First we provide background regarding the empirical 
environment, followed by more specific information regarding the specific 56 venture 
teams.   
 
Empirical environment  
The masters program is a venture creation program (Lackéus and Williams Middleton 
2015) in which students gain entrepreneurial competence through engaging in a venture 
creation process, where the venture becomes the main learning vessel.  The education 
partners with an incubator to provide resources and support for venture development, 
including a specified ‘incubation period’ in the final year of the masters.  The first year 
of the masters program includes a more traditional period of training and development 
including knowledge regarding intellectual property, market definition and positioning, 
technology-based business development and verification processes. During the final, 
“incubation” year, students are formed into teams of two to three and provided an idea.   
 
Student teams are semi-designed.  Each individual articulates his or her preferences 
towards teammates and idea.  These preferences are utilized by faculty and incubation 
staff to form teams.  As students are recruited to the program from different educational 
backgrounds, mainly represented by the engineering sciences and business, though 
occupationally also including students with background in law or design, there exists a 
certain degree of diversity across each cohort.  Diversity of student background is taken 
into consideration during team formation, as this is seen as facilitating differentiating 
perspectives and means of analysis upon problems and solutions, providing a more 
comprehensive basis for decision making.   
 
During the incubation year, teams are supported by a network of stakeholders and 
shareholders, including program faculty, incubation staff and external advisory 
networks. At the end of the incubation year, the team and incubator determine if the 
venture should incorporate. There are essentially three alternatives to incorporation of 
a venture into a company: non-commercial development, re-start, or termination. This 
illustrates the ‘realness’ of the educational environment, in that learning through 
entrepreneurship includes not only the learning by engaging the process of developing 
an idea into a business, but also learning from testing the viability of the idea as a 
business, and re-starting again when the idea ‘fails’.   
 
Data Collection 
The 56 group norms documents of the venture teams are written at the beginning of an 
incubation period for each cohort, lasting from September to June of each year.  The 
cohort groups, for example illustrated in Tables 2 and 3, are labeled by their graduate 
year.  Thus 2011 represents the cohort of ventures operating in the education-incubation 
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program from September 2010 to June 2011.  Each venture consists of two to three 
team members with variations of mixed gender and cultural background. The ‘group 
norms’ document, seen as a form of psychological contract written by teams when they 
first start their ventures, acts as the empirical basis of the study in order to examine the 
balance of control and trust mechanisms that teams initially establish for themselves.  
Supporting empirical evidence includes participant observation from non-team 
members present in the new venture environment, such as insight from group 
development talks and information regarding venture progress post education. Table 2 
provides a summary of the new venture teams.  
 
Table 2. New Venture Teams 2011 - 2015 
Year No. of 
Teams 
Same 
gender, 
Male 
Same 
gender, 
Female 
Mixed 
gender 
Mixed 
culture 
Status 
2011 11 9 1 1 8 6 continued; 1 of 
which still ongoing 
2012 12 5  0 7 5 6 continued; 3 of 
which still ongoing 
2013 12 1  2 9 5 8 continued; 5 of 
which still ongoing 
2014 11 5 2 4 3 10 continued; 6 of 
which still ongoing 
2015 10 1 2 7 2 6 continued; 5 of 
which still ongoing 
 
Data Analysis 
Two independent coders conducted an initial analysis of a selected cohort (2013) 
constituting twelve group norms documents representing twelve new venture teams, in 
order to identify trust-associated and control-associated language.  A list of key words 
representing either ‘trust’ or ‘control’ was generated and then the full range of 56 
documents (2011-2015) were coded using the key words.  This resulted in an initial 
ratio of trust to control language for each team, and for each cohort.  The ratios was 
marked as a baseline check for the theoretical coding framework.  
 
Next, the two independent coders applied the theoretical framework, with scale C1 to 
C3, and T1 to T5, to a selected cohort (2011) and then discussed coding to test the 
consistency of the applied framework. As the templates and writing styles differentiated 
across the documents, adjustments to the coding framework application in order to 
establish consistency.  For example, we discussed how to address text presented in 
bulleted lists compared to text presented in full sentences or meanings.  Based on the 
adjustments, the 56 group norms documents were coded independently by the two 
coders.  Results of coding were compiled into a common data set for analysis, both for 
each cohort year, and in a comprehensive summary of all years (all 56 documents). 
Compilation involved average each independent code for all categories (C1-C3 and T1-
T5), for each document, making note of when coding score differentiated by more than 
two points.  The averaged codes generated a trust to control ratio for each document 
(venture team), as well as a collective ratio for all 56 teams, presented in Table 3. The 
status of the venture upon completion of the incubation year is also presented in Table 
3. This information was obtained and verified by an independent staff member 
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responsible for incubation of the ventures developed through the program and is current 
as of October 2015.  
 
Table 3. Control to Trust Ratio in group norms documents 
Project %C %T Current venture status 
2011-A 63% 37% continued for a period 
2011-B 56% 44% continued for a period 
2011-C 67% 33% shut down 
2011-D 60% 40% continued for a period 
2011-E 55% 45% shut down 
2011-F 64% 36% continued for a period 
2011-G 64% 36% on going 
2011-H 69% 31% continued for a period 
2011-I 72% 28% shut down 
2011-J 71% 29% shut down 
2011-K 70% 30% shut down 
2012-A 70% 30% shut down 
2012-B 67% 33% continued for a period 
2012-C 73% 27% on going 
2012-D 63% 37% shut down 
2012-E 77% 23% on going 
2012-F 69% 31% shut down 
2012-G 72% 28% continued for a period 
2012-H 78% 22% shut down 
2012-I 50% 50% continued for a period 
2012-J 70% 30% shut down 
2012-K 62% 38% on going 
2012-L 70% 30% shut down  
2013-A 59% 41% shut down 
2013-B 66% 34% shut down 
2013-C 66% 34% continued for a period 
2013-D 63% 38% continued for a period 
2013-E 65% 35% on going 
2013-F 63% 38% on going 
2013-G 44% 56% continued/now paused 
2013-H 48% 52% on going 
2013-I 66% 34% shut down 
2013-J 63% 37% continued/shut down 
2013-K 46% 54% on going 
2013-L 58% 42% on going 
2014-A 59% 41% continued for a period 
2014-B 70% 30% on going 
2014-C 65% 35% paused 
2014-D 64% 36% on going 
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Project %C %T Current venture status 
2014-E 58% 42% transferred 
2014-F 52% 48% shut down 
2014-G 61% 39% on going 
2014-H 57% 43% on going 
2014-I 40% 60% continued for a period 
2014-J 70% 30% continued for a period 
2014-K 30% 70% on going 
2015-A 47% 53% on going 
2015-B 59% 41% on going 
2015-C 61% 39% shut down 
2015-D 48% 52% paused 
2015-E 61% 39% shut down 
2015-F 63% 37% shut down 
2015-G 54% 46% on going 
2015-H 50% 50% on going 
2015-I 60% 40% on going 
2015-J 59% 41% shut down 
Total = 56 62% 38% 18 shut down; 19 on going 
 
Limitations 
The differentiating structure of the group norms documents presented some challenges 
in applying the coding developed through the analytical framework.  In order to 
effectively apply the framework, the two coders went through three iterations of coding 
application and discussion on example text.  This potentially biased the coders to each 
other’s’ interpretation of the data, reducing the independence of their coding.  There 
are also limitations to the coding framework at this stage, as it would be improved 
through further application and evaluation, including generation of example phrases to 
represent the descriptors.  Once the coding framework is refined, the study would also 
benefit from coding by an independent third party.   
 
Results and Discussion 
Table 3 presents the control to trust ratios of the group norms documents for each team, 
as well as the average ratio for all 56 teams. Our findings show that nascent 
entrepreneurs in the venture teams are primed for control rather than trust in the early 
stage of venture creation. Based on the coding structure, the group norm documents 
were found to emphasize controlling (average 62%) rather than trusting (average 38%) 
language for all 56 venture teams. Across all 56 venture teams, the range of control-
trust ratio was from 78% control to 22% trust (2012-H), to 30% control to 70% trust 
(2014-K).   
 
For the 2011 cohort, representing eleven teams, the average ratio was 65% control to 
35% trust.  For the 2012 cohort, representing twelve teams, the average was 68% 
control to 32% trust.  For the 2013 cohort, representing twelve teams, the average was 
59% control to 41% trust.  For the 2014 cohort, representing eleven teams, the average 
was 58% control to 42% trust.  And finally, for the 2015 cohort, representing ten teams, 
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the average was 56% control to 44% trust.  This illustrates that over time the cohorts 
generally became less control oriented in their norms documentation.  
 
In the control coding, C2 was the most common, representing 69% of all the coded 
control language.  For trust, T3 was the most common, representing 62% of all trust 
language.  None of the norms documents were seen to provide illustration of T5, 
identity-based trust, and very low percentage of documents presented T1, deterrence-
based trust.   
 
Answering the research questions 
Our first research question (RQ1) asked: In what ways if at all do control and trust 
guide the development of group norms in new venture teams? Given the larger emphasis 
on control language across all 56 venture teams, it seems that a certain measure of 
control is necessary. Control language guides working principles and day-to-day 
operations that enable the team to collectively function around the same general 
purpose – the creation of the venture.  This can be illustrated in the control coding 
through the majority of control codes associated to C2 – behavioral control – which 
describes the way in which teams expected one another to communicate information 
and deliver towards stated goals. In line with Eisenhardt (1985) teams appeared to 
exercise behavioral control as a way to program the task of creating a venture. For 
example, many of the documents stated working hours, roles and responsibilities, 
decision making procedures, procedures for sharing information across the team, and 
how to address conflicts.  These means for control can be seen as constructive and 
supportive of the general function of the teamwork.  However, in some cases, it was 
recognized that control language led to excessive monitoring, a lack of individual 
autonomy, lack of flexibility and ability to adapt to changes influencing the venture.  
Reduction of individual autonomy potentially reduces the team’s ability to gain from 
the individual strengths of its members, as they are required to conform to a general 
practice.  However, lack of control could lead to chaos, lack of coordination of 
resources and efforts, and even counter-productive activity.  
 
Control language was seen as useful in stating expectations of how individuals are to 
contribute to the team. For example a C2 statement from 2014-E: “Group working 
hours should mainly and preferably be 08:30 -16:00 Monday-Thursday, 08:30-14:00 
[Friday].  This is office hours where the team work together.” However, controlling 
norms could be seen as overly constrictive when aimed towards monitoring individual 
behavior.  For example 2014-A, states: “When meeting external partners, all persons 
in the management team should be at the site 20 minutes before, well prepared”.  This 
implies that all members are expected to attend all meetings, which was also a 
phenomenon often observed by faculty and staff.  Another example from 2013-B states: 
“Decisions should always be preceded by a discussion. If consensus cannot be reached, 
voting is applied. The team members shall not put any pride in decisions made. Who of 
the team members are involved in the decision making process is depending on the 
nature of the decision. An informal policy on who partakes in what decision making 
process will be established over time. In general, anyone who will be impacted by a 
decision should have a saying and be part of the decision making process.” implying 
that individuals are not allowed to take decisions independently for the team. Norms 
demonstrating C3 represented a clan mentality, for example from 2011-K “United front 
on communicating our mission, vision, values”.  
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In the norms documents, language associated to trust tended to illustrate teams allowing 
individuals to work from their own strengths, and a belief that this would lead to the 
whole being greater than the sum of its parts. Trust-oriented communication illustrated 
anchoring of key information with team-members, rather than requiring that everyone 
know everything at any given point in time.  For example, 2014–F “We want to build 
up trust within the group by being transparent and honest with each other (…) Through 
building trust and transparency within the group, our ambition is to be able to give and 
receive genuine and constructive feedback (…) Our ambition is to have an open, quick 
and effective communication, both inside the team and towards other parties”. 
Transparency was used as a way to facilitate autonomy, rather than to monitor the 
activity of each member in the team.  Teamwork built on trust-based behavior 
relinquished requirements on time spent communicating every new piece of 
information, allowing the team to operate in a more efficient and agile manner.  
Documents with trust-based language, particularly T4, emphasized the importance of 
the emotional and supportive responsibility of the team members towards one another, 
which aligns with Dietz and Hartog (2006). Language allowing for mistakes and 
encouraging providing a helping hand when necessary, regardless of cause, was more 
common to trust-based norms documents. For example, 2012–K “In hard time we 
should always seek support among each other (…) Unskilled areas is nothing to be 
ashamed of, it is them we want to improve”.  
 
Trust language in norms seem to be more appreciative of individual differences, but 
build on a general assumption that the individual wants what is best for the venture.  
For example, in document 2015-H: “It is of high importance that everyone in the team 
feel confident and comfortable to take decisions and that the group supports the 
decisions that the individual has taken. This will keep the team moving forward if one 
decision turns out to be ‘wrong’ the rest of the team will be there to support and help 
since we all have the mindset that the one making the decision had the projects best in 
mind when he or she made it.”   
 
Addressing RQ2: In what ways if at all is trust built through group norms?, we found 
that the group norms documents seemed more limited in illustrating the way in which 
trust was discussed in the groups, compared to the way in which control mechanisms 
for group work was established. Within the documents, teams sometimes 
communicated summarization of discussions in bulleted lists, which often articulated 
expectations of how to work and communicate, in controlling language, but stated that 
these resulted from hours of discussion.  We hypothesize that these discussions 
involved language that might have been coded as trust-based, but did not end up in the 
document.  As faculty involved in group development talks which followed the creation 
of the group norms, this hypothesis is supported in some cases, as groups explain the 
reasoning behind the stated norms as based on assumptions or taken-for-granted trust 
between team members.  They felt that as it was obvious to them in the group that they 
were to operate on trust, they did not explicitly state this in the norms. 
 
Association of control-trust language to venture performance was not a direct research 
question, but we were still able to draw some initial reflections regarding potential 
relationship between the level of trust in the group and the eventual performance of the 
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venture. Overall, the teams that had higher percentage (50% or more, up to 70%1) of 
trust language in their group norms had at least one of the team members continuing 
with the venture after completion of the education.  19 of the 56 ventures ended up 
shutting down directly after the education.  These ventures averaged a higher level of 
control based language (65%) in their group norms.  However, the range between the 
19 ventures was from 52% control language to 78% control language.  It is important 
to note that the reason for shutting down varied.  In some cases, the reason given was 
the low viability of the actual idea, whereas in other cases, it was clearer that the venture 
did not continue because the team members did not want to continue together.     
 
Another interesting observation that merits further study is the influence of 
heterogeneity of the team in the level of control vs. trust language.  Across the 56 teams, 
the teams that had more heterogeneity in the team structure, either in terms of gender 
or in terms of Swedish compared to non-Swedish upbringing, had a tendency to have 
higher percentage of control language in their group norms documents.  In terms of 
cultural differences, this is not necessarily surprising, as working across cultural 
understanding could require increased emphasis on communication and behavioral 
control, which the teams would likely recognize and therefore integrate into their norms 
documents.   
 
Recognizing that from year to year, group norms became increasingly trust-based in 
their language, may indicate institutional learning between yearly cohorts as well as 
program faculty and incubation staff.  For example, instructions and educational 
material provided to the teams to support their writing of the group norms documents 
changed over time.  Expected structure and content was made increasingly flexible, and 
more at the team’s discretion, which may have allowed for teams to be more descriptive 
in how they intended to work together, and release requirement to communicate work 
structure.  
 
Implications 
This paper provides initial insight into the way in which trust and control are utilized 
within new venture teams in early stages of venture development, as illustrated through 
group norms documents.  The study also provides some additional insight into the use 
of group norms documents.  Through analysis of the text in the group norms documents, 
we were both struck by the limitations posed by formulating norms into written 
documentation.  We recognized that many of the new venture teams emphasized 
describing what and how they intended to act and operate, without articulating why 
they had these intentions.  When asked about the lack of ‘underlying reasoning’ in the 
documents during groups talks, the venture teams often explained that they had spent 
time discussing the underlying reasoning when they were creating the norms, but it was 
only the end result that was compiled in the norms document.  In this sense, the new 
venture teams could be seen to generate intuitive understanding that is not captured in 
the norms.  Also, as this understanding is not articulated in written text, it could be lost 
or reinterpreted over time, which could influence the viability of the norm statement 
presented in the written text.  Thus, we recognize that there may be a need to guide 
development of group norm documentation that would include description of the 
underlying reasoning associated to the norm created.  New venture teams also                                                         1 This was the highest percentage of trust language for all of the 56 teams.  Only one venture, from the 2014 cohort, had a norms document with a 30% control to 70% trust ratio.   
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mentioned that sometimes certain norms were ‘taken for granted’ and thus perceived 
as too obvious to commit to written text.  Again, this could indicate a need to refine 
norm documentation to include underlying assumptions or that which seems obvious 
to the new venture team.  
 
Next steps based on the pilot study underlying this paper include refining the coding 
framework for recognizing control and trust indicators in team language (written and 
oral), as well as investigating the control-trust relationship within new venture teams 
over time, and effective use of trust or control mechanisms at critical incidents.  Future 
research can also include investigation of which types of control foster trust; if and how 
individuals may be primed for control; and the role of gender, culture, control-need, 
proclivity to trust, and relationship to uncertainty and the impacts of these on trust. 
Lastly, conducting a longitudinal process based study to examine whether teams can 
create norms in a way that build, maintain and repair trust would be insightful.     
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